Human history Essay

valet history has witnessed many examples of contends. Our history has taught us that warfares ar unique by nature. Different philosophers at varied times were trying to generate solid philosophicalal regardings of what war and strategy were. As a result, we throw sufficient theoretical basis for discussing the philosophical foundations of war, yet we have non been able to predict our legions failures. After the end of WWII the world has finally taken a deep breath, and people were confident that furiousness would neer enter their lives again.However, we atomic number 18 still surrounded by constant perils of war, and continue witnessing the acts of violence, and murders. Certainly, contemporary wars are completely different from those at the beginning of the 20th century the develop custodyt of the new weaponry types and discourse technologies, have move the simplest army actions into highly sophisticated acts. The war in Iraq has critically impacted the legions b alance in the world, and it is elicit to see, how Iraki war would be explained through the prism of various philosophic grows.Claexercisingwitz On war Carl von Cla expendwitz has written a well grounded research on the philosophy of war. His theoretical assumptions function it possible to unwrap philosophic implications of armed major powers actions. Having evaluated what war is, Clausewitz was able to create a general bodily structure of war, and I think that his ideas are easily applied to the issues of the war in Iraq. War is nothing nevertheless a duel on an extreme scale. If we would conceive as a unit the countless repress of duels which make up a war, we shall do so best by supposing to ourselves both wrestlers.Each strives by physical force to compel the early(a) to submit his will to his will each endeavours to throw his adversary, and consequently render him incapable of further resistance (Clausewitz 1989, p. 4). Although, this Clausewitz definition is very objective, grounded, and universally relevant ( any(prenominal) war implies the competitiveness of several opponents for power), there are some amendments which should be made in terms of war in Iraq.It is difficult to admit, but it is true, that the war in Iraq is nothing more than the postulate for power Clausewitz does not distinguish whether this might be frugal, social, or force power, or some other different aspect of semi semipolitical superiority. Clausewitz risks rendering limited perspectives to discussing what war is. In the advertise between the two wrestlers, only one of them initially seeks superiority. As a result, at the initial put of war, only one of the opponents fights for power and superiority.Clausewitz supports this line stating that two motives mavin men to war instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of war, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these p artistic productionicles, because it is the near general. H as the U. S. started the war in Iraq with hostile intentions? Probably, it has. Many of us press the fact that the U. S. troops actions in Iraq were primarily aimed at promoting democracy in the pastoral.To be objective, hardly any democracy can survive in the whirl of blood, murders, terrorist acts and violence caused by military actions. However, in the fight between Iraq and the U. S. Clausewitz seems to have neglected one essential stage of developing military actions the first stage is the military intervention, and it hardly looks as the fight of the two wrestlers. On the contrary, its image is similar to unexpected despoil on the side of the opponent to which another wrestler cannot stand and falls.The situation described by Clausewitz is really the next stage of war. Iraq required certain period of time to gather it strength and to enter the war as an equal. At the stage when we started to receive the reports on murders and terrorist acts against American soldiers, one could suggest that the war has turned into the discussed fight. However, in this fight one of the opponents was trying to prove his superiority, while the other tried his best to preserve the integrity of his physical territory and peace in the country.We cannot but agree with Clausewitz that war is never an quarantined act, and it is never a separated single military blow. War does not spring up fastly, it does not spread to the full in a moment each of the two opponents can, therefore, rule an opinion of the other, in a great measure, from what he is and what he does, instead of judging of him according to what he, strictly speaking, should be or should do (Clausewitz 1989, 5) The war in Iraq had large prehistory. The United States were continuously trying to defend their position in this military conflict.It was evident that the war was inevitable. As a result it is difficult to argue the position of Clausewitz. Actually, the work of Clausewitz seems to be very end to what we currently witness in Iraq. Of course, we do not know practically as none of us has fortunately participated in this campaign. All we have at our disposal are news reports and other secondary information, but this secondary information allows analyzing the tied(p)ts in Iraq from the viewpoints of several philosophers. Clausewitz creates a philosophic picture of war.He implies that war does not change its face, and the structure of military actions and interactions remains unchanged, no emergence at what historic period of our development a war may occur. This does not really case, whether we use nuclear weapons or fight in the open sea the war is always the utmost use of force, which does not break out of sudden, and which is the mean of proving ones superiority. Jablonski Roots of Strategy In his work, David Jablonski has evaluated the safe and pass kit and boodle of the four theorists, as applied to military actions and military strategies.It is surprising, that Jablonsk i was able to avoid bias in his discussion. It is even more surprising, that the works of philosophers written at the beginning of the 20th century seem to have predicted the submit course of events during the war in Iraq. This, on the one hand, continues the line found in the work of Clausewitz the warmheartedness of military actions remains unchanged through the centuries. On the other hand, Jablonskis selection helps us understand WHY the U. S. was involved into the war in Iraq, and has actually initiated it. In the United States our people have been late to realize the changed conditions.Isolated as we have been from possible enemies, the people could see little chance for infringement by others. Separated as we are from Europe by the Atlantic, and from Asia by the Pacific which form most certain and tremendously strong defensive barriers, we seemed to be protected by the design of the Almighty. The vulnerability of the whole country to aircraft as distinguished from the ol d conditions that obtained when the frontiers or the coast had to be penetrated before an invasion of the country could be made, has greatly interested the people of the body politic (Jablonski 1999, 452)What facts do we have in the war against Iraq? First, the U. S. has for long been isolated from others aggression. Even during WWII the U. S. was not directly involved into military actions. The terrorist acts of 2001 have been a tremendous portentous therapy to the whole American nation. The continuous isolation from the direct aggression has made the U. S. senseless towards possible military and terrorist threats. The image of the almighty nation was preferably exaggerated, and the events of 9/11 have proved this assumption.The terrorist attacks had to attract the guardianship of the U. S. to its vulnerability and to eliminate the discussed senselessness, but the country has misinterpreted these events. The senselessness has turned into aggression against the states which were suspected in promoting act of terrorism (Iraq is in the top list of such promoters). As far as the United States has not experient any acts of continuous aggression, which it could not stand, it has not fully realized the continuous effects of military actions brought into Iraki land.In the introduction to his book, David Jablonski puts emphases on the most critical elements of war. Modern military forces normally work in an environment in which the major dilemma is that of properly matching continuity and change. the core attribute to such thinking is to imagine the future as it may be when it becomes the past a thing of knotty continuity. Thus, planning continuity and looking at military actions through the prism of the past is the crucial element in making this strategy reasonable and justified. What are continuous impacts that the U.S. has caused onto the Iraqi population? These are economic defeat, and the acquire to restore all social and political structures of the country. It is still unclear whether the U. S. was able to promote elective ideals in Iraq, but it is evident that it has failed to apply the principles of continuity through the past to planning the Iraqi military strategy. Jablonski states that the significance of the theoretical works he discussed in his book is in that they are presented in a structured manner, and can be easily understood and applied in practice.It seems that both the U. S. in its war in Iraq, and the terrorists in their 9/11 attacks have applied the principles discussed by Jablonski sometimes implicitly, more practically explicitly, they created images of how aerial destruction of vital centers, could bring a nation to its knees. After all, there were the examples of mass brat on the home fronts and mutiny in the trenches during the recent war. Similar to Clausewitz, who creates parallels between military actions and wrestling, Jablonski also underlines the sizeableness of the sudden effect.Consequentiall y, we come to understanding an interesting military controversy military campaigns cannot be sudden, but the sudden effect of aerial or other destruction often determines the success of the planned military campaign. These two elements are integral to the U. S. intervention to Iraq, too. Liddell-Hart Strategy There are the two crucial elements which make Liddell-Harts view applicable to the war in Iraq first, the author extensively researches the historical implications of specific military actions, and second, he does not expand his research to broader notions, but is rather concentrated on the cause-effect research.His book is in many instances similar to that of Clausewitz. This is why the author is initially biased. In both works the reader meets identical philosophical parallels To move along the line of natural expectation consolidates the opponents balance and thus increases his resisting power. In war, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without loosening his foothold and upsetting the balance results in self-exhaustion, increasing in disproportionate ration to the effective strain upon him.Success by such method only becomes possible through an immense margin of superior strength in some form and, even so, tends to lose decisiveness. (Liddell-Hart 1991, 5) In this citation, we find many elements which have already been found in other philosophical works loosening foothold may be paralleled to the sudden aerial attacks, while miserable along the line of natural expectation is similar to complying with the principles of continuity and thorough planning. Simultaneously, it is difficult to apply this record to the military actions in Iraq. If the U. S.used Liddell-Harts philosophical implications in developing its strategy in Iraq, it would never apply the means of sudden attack against the Iraqi nation. People in Iraq would not know what means creation bombed. As a result, the U. S. would risk losing its powerful positions. The philo sophic perspective created by Liddell-Hart is hardly applicable to the war in Iraq or to any other military campaign in contemporary world. In addition, when Liddell-Hart speaks about morale in war, he represents its too idealistic image the violence of American soldiers against Iraqi people eliminates any possibility to link morale to the war in Iraq.Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince A prince ought to have no other aim or thought, nor select anything else for his study, than war and its rules and discipline for this is the sole art that belongs to him who rules, and it is of such force that it not only upholds those who are born princes, but it often enables men to rise from a buck private station to that rank. This is another aspect of the war in Iraq, described in the terms of Niccolo Machiavellis The Prince. As Hitler used the war to prove his superiority and to create the nation of Aryans, the U. S.seems to be in constant need to prove its superiority to other nations. Several re cent decades have turned into the years of constant fight, in which the U. S. always positioned itself as the leading and powerful nation Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Yugoslavia, and finally, Iraq who is going to be the next? Machiavelli makes special strain on the importance for the prince to understand and to birth the art of war a prince who does not understand the art of war, over and above other misfortunes already mentioned, cannot be respected by his soldiers, nor can he deposit on them. (Machiavelli, 2006)The best information and intelligence resources have been employed to develop a sound military strategy towards Iraq, yet the U. S. was not able to display a skilful approach towards Iraqi intervention. legion(predicate) deaths of the American soldiers and their inability to find common language with the native population, whom they had to protect, suggest that the United States did not possess any sound military skills. Expectation of easy victory usually leads to ea sy failure. The war in Iraq has displayed the U. S. inability to analyze the world military history, about which Machiavelli speaks.The author refers to the importance for the prince to study the actions of illustrious men and to see how they behaved themselves during war. Being powerful does not mean being non-educated being powerful means being skillful, reasonable, and objective. Military failures in Vietnam and Yugoslavia have not taught the U. S. any meaningful lessons. In distinction from Clausewitz, Liddell-Hart, and Jablonski, Machiavelli did not apply any historical perspectives to evaluating military strategies, but he was wise enough to emphasize the importance of historical lessons, and of the ability to properly evaluate these lessons.Peter Paret Makers of Modern Strategy While Clausewitz applied the painting parallels to researching war, Paret has performed a profound research of several philosophic writings related to the topic of war. All authors he discussed in his book sought to answer several crucial questions whether it was possible to evaluate war, whether it was a viable nib of foreign policy, and how ethical war was. Parets views are directly connected with the understanding of nuclear threats as applied to military strategies. Parets book is actually the selection of the major philosophic works and their evaluation.It seems that modern font philosophers try to distance themselves from creating their own ideas about war, but prefer analyzing the ideas of others as applied to contemporary political and military environment. In the introduction to his book, Paret writes that strategy is the use of armed force to achieve the military objectives and, by extension, the political purpose of the war. To those engaged in the direction and conduct of war, strategy has often appeared more simply, in Moltkes phrase, as a system of expedients Thus, war is initially the conjunction of political and military ideas.The war in Iraq is also the combina tion of political and military aims, but which of them prevails? In his book, Paret often cannot make a case. He states that Machiavelli lived during the time when warfare was unregulated and thus the relevance of his assumptions could decrease. However, who says that our warfare is regulated? Paret suggests that while Clausewitz support the idea of war to be limited in time, goals, and strategies, there was no place to global military campaigns. Does this mean that local military conflicts similar to those in Iraq cannot expand beyond the geographical borders of the Iraqi nation?They can, and the conflict in Iraq has already stretched itself across the world. The war in Iraq has already turned into the political fight between the two opposing political camps, and the perspective of the global war has never been so close since the end of WWII. This is why it is difficult to understand the aim of Parets analysis. For the aims of objective military research, one should rather read the original works of philosophers, than their subjective interpretations made by contemporary authors. Sun Tzu The Art of WarWhoever is first in the domain and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemys will to be imposed on him. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our summer camp be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unexplainable in his way (Sun Tzu 1971, 24)The ideas of war produced by Sun Tzu, partially seem as odd as the instruments he offers to use if one does not want to fight. On the one hand, being first to the field also implies using sudden maneuver. On the other hand, what odd instruments could Iraqi people use to openly claim their desire not to start war with the U. S.? One should not repeat its tactics which had been roaring earlier, but it should be regulated according to the constantly changing military environments. Moreover, using the tactics which has already proved to be a failure is a guaranteed double failure. The U. S.has not taken into account numerous important elements of an effective military strategy being sudden does not always mean being successful. Aerial attacks make people fall to their knees, but do not break them completely. The U. S. develops a sound strategy of removing its military from the Iraqi territory. The aim is to turn retreat into a victory, which is virtually impossible. Until the U. S. is able to re-evaluate its defeats and tactics in previous military campaigns, it will have to be prepared to new military failures. goal I think that each of the analyzed philosophers has something to say about the war in Iraq.Each of them discussed interesting elements of military strategy which could be applied to Iraqi military campaign s. Although certain views are limited, some risk being biased, and some cannot make the case at all, all of them deserve attention at to the lowest degree for having researched the question which we will hardly ever answer What is War? It is never stable, it is always changeable, it always has a different face, and sometimes we even fail to recognize it from the start. One thing is evident no matter how difficult a war can be, no excuses can justify our inability to fight well. BIBLIOGRAPHYClausewitz, C. On War. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1989. Jablonski, D. Roots of Strategy. Book 4. Merchanicsburg Stackpole Books, 1999. Liddel-Hart, Basil H. Strategy Second Revised Edition. New York Meridian Books, 1991. Machiavelli, N. The Prince. The Project Gutenberg, 2006. obtainable from http//www. gutenberg. org/files/1232/1232-h/1232-h. htm Paret, P. , G. A. Craig & F. Gilbert. Makers of Modern Strategy From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age. Princeton Princeton University Press, 1986. Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samueal B. Griffith. Oxford Oxford University Press, 1971.